Contents
- Policy entrepreneurs in the wild
- Organisations at the science-policy interface
- And what about expertise and policy in general?
- Is self-censorship a thing?
- What is truth, anyway?
- Fear, hope, and agency
- TL;DR the interpretive nature of science-policy
- References
Policy entrepreneurs in the wild
Following the previous weeknotes, I identified a few case studies of policy entrepreneurs (PEs) this week. With a fairly detailed framework of the attributes, skills and strategies of PEs, Mintrom (2019)1 presents several case studies. For instance, they consider that Ken Livingstone framed climate change as an urban issue helping to create the idea-sharing C40 network of cities. Considering emissions trading in the EU, Braun (2009)2 conclude that knowledge gives PEs power. Carter and Childs (2018)3 describe Friends of the Earth (FOE) as PEs with the “Big Ask” campaign which they launched in 2005 and which led to the UK Climate Change Bill. They describe a range of tactics used and how lessons learned by previous failed legislation was informative. By identifying the changes in framings, Aukes et al.(2018)4, describe a new perspective on the PE, the interpretative policy entrepreneur (IPE), regarding negotiations over a coastal restoration “Sand Motor” project. The IPE develops their framing by interaction with others. Observing from the inside at meetings and through confidential reports, von Malmborg (2024)5 describes how an “unorthodox” alliance of organisations was able to gain influence over incumbents in negotiations for decarbonising maritime transport. Contrasting methodologically, Arnold et al.(2016)6 use text mining and network analysis to find that pro- and anti-fracking PEs are affected by their connections and coalitions. Apart from the last of these case studies (which has less qualitative data), it is possible to identify the framings used by PEs and from these I suggest that the most influential PEs presented solutions (as opposed to problems) - perhaps these can be described as “agency-provoking stories” (De Meyer et al., 20207, p11) which play to action bias (Patt and Zeckhauser, 20008) in policymakers. Further, I noted possible evidence of “presoftening” (Cairney, 20189) in the FOE and Sand Motor case study.
Organisations at the science-policy interface
MacKillop et al.(2023)10 discuss knowledge brokering organisations, such as What Works Centres, finding that they act has both boundary organisations and PEs and another of Kingdon’s actors, the Problem Broker. Previously, I had looked a little at other boundary or interface organisations, such as Science-Policy Interfaces (like the UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the Intergovernmental Science-policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES), and the Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD)) as discussed in, Velander and Donà (2024)11, Balvanera et al.(2020)12 and Matuk et al.(2020)13, and policy labs Olejniczak et al.(2019)14. I am unsure about the differences between these types of organisation, or, yet, how effective they have been and by whose measures.
And what about expertise and policy in general?
My supervisor, Carolina, suggested I look at Killick (2023)15 because it discusses work investigating the nature of the relationship between decision-makers and experts in economics. Killick interviewed politicians in 5 countries to obtain their views on economics expertise and how they used it. I read chapters 1, 2 and 8 (it’s a very compelling read) and was surprised to learn how respect for economic expertise is declining. Particularly interesting for me was the method by which both economics knowledge, alignment as well as environmental perspectives were inferred - even when they were not explicitly asked about - using the existence or absence of mentions of economists, economics schools of thought and environmental issues.
Is self-censorship a thing?
This is actually about self-censurship - more in next weeknotes
Given the tl;dr in the previous weeknotes, I felt I needed to understand the nature of self-censorship and if there is much literature on it. Curiously, searches for “self-censor” on Web of Science and Semantic Scholar return many papers on moral disengagement, particularly around (immediately) violent contexts, such as violent crime and war. Detert *et al.(2008)16 uses surveys to assess moral disengagement and finds that it is linked to unethical decision making - noting that bureaucratic structures somewhat enable some of their found antecedents of model disengagement. Clayton (2024)17 found that an individuals’ perception that others are unconcerned about climate change (whether or not that is correct inference), can lead them to self-silence as well as pointing to social psychological work on the gap between scientists’ risk assessment and lack of public prioritisation. There is a hint that some scientists may have been silenced by the tactics described in the report ”Denial, Disinformation, and Doublespeak: Big Oil’s Evolving Efforts to Avoid Accountability for Climate Change” from House Committee on Oversight and Accountability Democrats and Senate Committee on the Budget, which came out this week. It is a very strongly worded account of how fossil industries and trade associations have obfuscated evidence, lobbied politicians and used funding and - and exclusion - to influence research and researchers in the US (COAD, 202418). Therefore, apart from the grey literature I cited in the previous weeknote, I found no other reports of self-censorship by scientists.
The issue of censorship is pertinent to writing these weeknotes. I note I am constantly testing my words against the various mental personas. Inevitably I leave out a good deal of my thinking. To me, this seems a normal and constant part of all discourse. However, the implication that I’ve gained from my skim of self-censorship literature is that self-censorship is only applied by individuals under limited, often negative, contexts. I do wonder if adjusting words, framings, emphasis and implied confidence is such a normal part of dialogue that many people don’t know they do it.
What is truth, anyway?
I’m trying to stick to weekday study only, for my sanity, but did allow myself one paper over the weekend - the fascinating “Alternative Facts and States of Fear: Reality and STS in an Age of Climate Fictions” by Radin (2019)19. It describes (with a little more colour than in Jasanoff (2019)20) the wrangling over the nature of truth in science and the purpose of science studies that occurred from the “Science Wars” of the 1990s onwards, as well as the fiction and non-fiction that arose to persuade the public about the nature of climate science and climate change. There was (is) a fundamental debate about whether science should stick only to the known facts - indeed if this is even possible, given the social nature of fact-making that has been identified by some (also Cayley and Schaffer (2009)21) - or if some topics are so important that emotion should be used to persuade and drive understanding. This also sent me down a short possible rabbit-hole into the Grievance Studies Affair, which nevertheless highlighted a possible avenue of academic self-censorship.
Fear, hope, and agency
A fundamental question in the works described by Radin (2019)19 is whether fear is an appropriate means by which critical science knowledge is conveyed. This took me back to the MPA Summit a couple of weeks ago. Based on psychology and neuroscience, Kris De Meyer had presented 7 insights (described in De Meyer et al. (2022)22). One was the insight that making people fearful isn’t a useful tactic motivating climate action. This was picked up by a speaker later in the day and consequently disputed by our keynote speaker, Clare Farrell, in a strange sort of Chinese Whispers. Clare’s perspective echoes the wider Extinction Rebellion observation that hope has been compulsory for much of climate communication for decades and has not led to climate action. But what Kris De Meyer was saying was that fear only motivates a small minority (probably limited by circumstances as also described in Kleres and Wettergren (2017)23), and it is more effective to motivate by conveying a message of their own agency (the “agency-provoking stories” mentioned above).
TL;DR the interpretive nature of science-policy
A theme running through the works that I’ve read/heard these last few days is that what and how information is conveyed for the purpose of persuading the public and policy-makers, as well as other experts, remains contentious. There is a political nature to knowledge that, in the policy literature, is accepted as core to roles that apply knowledge in decision-making contexts - it’s ok to pick and choose what and how knowledge is communicated - this is despite the belief that policy-making should be objective/rational. However, there are conflicts in the science domains regarding knowledge creation and communication that highlight tensions between the doctrine of objectivity and the reality that is an urgent need to convey difficult information in a way that inspires decision-making and action. In some cases, these have led to bitter disputes and silencing of some scientists (only this morning I learned about the rejection of aspects of Jean-Baptiste Lemarck’s 18th century work on evolution as “heresy”, that are now being more acceptable as the field of epigenetics Cayley and Lock, 200924). Perhaps more pertinently, I noted in case studies in the policy literature that “action” rather than “issue” knowledge was used by policy entrepreneurs when they “successfully” achieve a decision in their favour. This aligns with De Meyer et al. (2020)7, yet I have not found note of this distinction in knowledge types within the policy literature. It may be that there are other aspects to how the policy entrepreneur is operating that need further extraction. I remain fascinated by the nature of climate scientists’ interpretative communications, particularly when they may be considered as self-censoring. While I haven’t yet found mention of this in academic literature, there are other settings in which academics are known to be curtailing their language to avoid being excluded.
References
Mintrom, Michael (2019). “So you want to be a policy entrepreneur?” In: Policy Design and Practice 2.4, pp. 307–323. DOI: 10.1080/25741292.2019.1675989. URL: https://doi.org/10.1080/25741292.2019.1675989. ↩
Braun, Marcel (2009). “The evolution of emissions trading in the European Union – The role of policy networks, knowledge and policy entrepreneurs”. In: Accounting, Organizations and Society 34 (3-4). URL: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0361368208000561?via=ihub. ↩
Carter, Neil and Mike Childs (2018). “Friends of the Earth as a policy entrepreneur: ‘The Big Ask’ campaign for a UK Climate Change Act”. In: Environmental Politics 27.6, pp. 994–1013. DOI: 10.1080/09644016.2017.1368151. URL: https://doi.org/10.1080/09644016.2017.1368151. ↩
Aukes, Ewert et al.(2018). “Framing mechanisms: the interpretive policy entrepreneur’s toolbox”. In: Critical Policy Studies 12.4, pp. 406–427. DOI: 10.1080/19460171.2017.1314219. URL: https://doi.org/10.1080/19460171.2017.1314219. ↩
von Malmborg, Fredrik (2024). “At the controls: Politics and policy entrepreneurs in EU policy to decarbonize maritime transport”. In: Review of Policy Research. URL: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ropr.12609. ↩
Arnold, Gwen et al.(2016). “Social Networks and Policy Entrepreneurship: How Relationships Shape Municipal Decision Making about High-Volume Hydraulic Fracturing”. In: Policy Networks. URL: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/psj.12175. ↩
De Meyer, Kris et al.(2020). “Transforming the stories we tell about climate change: from ‘issue’ to ‘action’”. In: Environmental Research Letters 16.1. DOI: 10.1088/1748-9326/abcd5a. URL: https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1748-9326/abcd5a. ↩ ↩2
Patt, Anthony and Richar Zeckhauser (2000). “Action Bias and Environmental Decisions”. In: Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 21, pp. 45–72. URL: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1023/A:1026517309871. ↩
Cairney, Paul (2018). “Three habits of successful policy entrepreneurs”. In: Policy & Politics 46.2, pp. 199–215. DOI: 10.1332/030557318X15230056771696. URL: https://bristoluniversitypressdigital.com/view/journals/pp/46/2/article-p199.xml. ↩
MacKillop, Eleanor et al.(2023). “Making sense of knowledge-brokering organisations: boundary organisations or policy entrepreneurs?” In: Science and Public Policy 50.6, pp. 950–960. ISSN: 0302-3427. DOI: 10.1093/scipol/scad029. eprint: https://academic.oup.com/spp/article-pdf/50/6/950/54252849/scad029.pdf. URL: https://doi.org/10.1093/scipol/scad029. ↩
Velander, Sara and Matteo De Donà (2024). “Leveraging windows of opportunity for expertise to matter in global environmental governance: insights from the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification”. In: Frontiers in Climate 5. DOI: 10.3389/fclim.2023.1325030. URL: https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fclim.2023.1325030/full. ↩
Balvanera, Patriciaet al.(2020). “The science-policy interface on ecosystems and people: challenges and opportunities”. In: Ecosystems and People 16.1, pp. 345–353. DOI: 10.1080/26395916 . 2020 . 1819426. URL: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/26395916.2020.1819426. ↩
Matuk, Fernanda Ayaviri et al.(2020). “Including diverse knowledges and worldviews in environmental assessment and planning: the Brazilian Amazon Kaxinawá Nova Olinda Indigenous Land case”. In: Ecosystems and People 16.1, pp. 95–113. DOI: 10.1080/26395916.2020.1722752. ↩
Olejniczak, Karol et al.(2019). “Policy labs: the next frontier of policy design and evaluation?” In: Policy & Politics 48 (1), pp. 89–110. DOI: 10.1332/030557319X15579230420108. URL: https://bristoluniversitypressdigital.com/view/journals/pp/48/1/article-p89.xml. ↩
Killick, Anna (2023). Politicians and Economic Experts: The Limits of Technocracy. eng. 1st ed. Newcastle Upon Tyne: Agenda Publishing. ISBN: 1788215656. URL: https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/politicians-and-economic-experts/CB80182085E01CC8186F4F5FA97A66B0. ↩
Detert, James R. et al.(2008). “Moral disengagement in ethical decision making: A study of antecedents and outcomes”. In: Journal of Applied Psychology 93 (2). DOI: 10.1037/0021-9010.93.2.374. URL: https://oce-ovid-com.libproxy.ucl.ac.uk/article/00004565-200803000-00010/HTML. ↩
Clayton, Susan (2024). “A social psychology of climate change: Progress and promise”. In: British Journal of Social Psychology. DOI: 10.1111/bjso.12749. URL: https://bpspsychub.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/bjso.12749. ↩
COAD (2024). Denial, Disinformation, and Doublespeak: Big Oil’s Evolving Efforts to Avoid Accountability for Climate Change. Joint Staff Report. House Committee on Oversight and Accountability Democrats and Senate Committee on the Budget. eprint: https://www.budget.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/fossil_fuel_report1.pdf. ↩
Radin, Joanna (2019). “Alternative Facts and States of Fear: Reality and STS in an Age of Climate Fictions”. In: Minerva, pp. 411–431. URL: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11024-019-09374-5. ↩ ↩2
Jasanoff, Sheila (2019). “Controversy Studies”. In: The Blackwell Encyclopedia of Sociology. URL: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/9781405165518.wbeosc130.pub2. ↩
Cayley, David and Simon Schaffer (2009). How To Think About Science - Part 1. URL: https://www.cbc.ca/player/play/audio/1.464989. ↩
De Meyer, Kris et al.(2022). Net Zero Innovation Programme: Seven Insights to Manage the Complex Nature of Climate Action Delivery. URL: [https://www.ucl.ac.uk/climate-action-unit/sites/climate_action_unit/files/seven_insights_-summary_and_where_to_find_more.pdf](https://www.ucl.ac.uk/climate-action-unit/sites/climate_action_unit/files/seven_insights-_summary_and_where_to_find_more.pdf). ↩
Kleres, Jochen and Âsa Wettergren (2017). “Fear, hope, anger, and guilt in climate activism”. In: Social Movement Studies 16.5, pp. 507–519. URL: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/318307076_Fear_hope_anger_and_guilt_in_climate_activism. ↩
Cayley, David and Margaret Lock (2009). How To Think About Science - Part 3. URL: http://www.cbc.ca/radio/ideas/how-to-think-about-science-part-3-1.465009. ↩
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